This month marks the two-and-a-half-year anniversary of our invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Violence and terrorism continue and the future stability of the country is anything but certain. In contrast, our occupation of Japan (1945-1952) was peaceful and the transition to democratic self-government was relatively smooth. Why the difference?
The environments were quite different. Japan had an ancient and respected institution of a single ruler - the emperor - whose order to surrender was final for all save a few fanatics. It is not irrelevant that Japan, despite the war, the defeat, the surrender, and becoming a highly modern and progressive nation, still has a monarchy. Iraq had no such institution.
A second difference is that Japan was a homogeneous country. There was no real chance that the country would fall apart after the conquest. Iraq's identity as a nation remains uncertain, because of religious and racial differences.
Finally, the pre-war hostility of the Japanese toward America was less than Arab hostility toward the United States today. Many Japanese saw us as inferior barbarians; in contrast, many Arabs see us as the Great Satan.
THE POSTWAR political situation was entirely different. Steering Japan toward a constitutional democracy with an elected parliament was easier than doing the same in Iraq for a remarkably simple reason: Japan already had all these things. Japan had a constitution and a parliament, and its government was led by a prime minister - just like today. True, the modern system functions much better than its prewar counterpart, but Japan's political transition was in some ways less drastic than what Iraq is now attempting.
Expectations of the subordinate nations differed. The Japanese had been told that the Americans would be brutal and harsh conquerors. They were told that we would rape, pillage and burn Japan if we won. The effects of our bombing raids and the horror created by our atom bombs added credibility to this view. Instead, the Japanese experienced a mild and conciliatory occupation. This probably helped eliminate any latent motivations for violent resistance by taking away a potential reason for fighting. Certainly the United States was able to maintain a positive image in Japan.
IN IRAQ, THIS has proved far more difficult. Iraqis had higher expectations. Our war effort was aimed at the person of Saddam Hussein, not Iraq as a whole. But a number of problems occurred. While advances in technology made it possible to minimize civilian casualties, dropping a large number of bombs invariably causes death and destruction beyond the intended target. The dissolution of Iraq's armed forces and security services created a vacuum that we were not prepared to fill. The economy collapsed, social order was lost, electricity and water became unreliable, unemployment soared, and Iraqis constantly fear for their lives.
American efforts to rebuild the infrastructure and resume the exporting of oil were severely hampered by the bands of killers euphemistically called "insurgents." Furthermore, the insurgents have made it clear that they will kill anyone who cooperates with the Americans. Bad publicity further impaired our image.
The military situation is radically different. In a nutshell, Japan had not previously been conquered; the land of Iraq has been conquered by many. An entire college semester would not suffice to study all the nations that have invaded and occupied Iraq. For the Japanese, therefore, a foreign presence was a greater shock than for the Iraqis. The Iraqis had learned how to be defiant when defeated, the Japanese were stunned and paralyzed by their defeat.
THE ROLE OF religion is also quite a contrast. The Japanese had once defeated a Mongol invasion because a divine wind (kamikaze) had destroyed the Mongol fleet. The Japanese expected a similar storm to strike the Americans. It did - the U.S. Navy was struck by the worst typhoon in modern history - but it did not save Japan. Traditional Japanese had expected their religion to save them, and it had not. No such demoralization exists in Iraq. Iraqis did not expect God to save Saddam Hussein despite the latter's belated rediscovery of Islam.
Japan was also exhausted. Its war had begun with the invasion of China in 1937. Eight years and 2 million deaths later, Japan's enthusiasm for war was not what it had been. Iraq had also endured a war followed by a confrontation involving sanctions, but no serious fighting the 12 years before the recent invasion. Japan and America also clearly had a common enemy - the Soviet empire. Although Japan was technically a neutral power in the Cold War, there was never any question about its orientation. In Iraq, such a clear identification with the United States is not possible, largely because of Iraq's internal divisions and Arab neighbors.
The situation in Iraq is more difficult than that faced in Japan in 1945. The mission in World War II in the Pacific was straightforward; stop Japan's aggression. Nobody cared much about the methods. Japan had no friends or allies in Asia. Today the abuse of a handful of prisoners becomes a media event; in 1945 very few questioned the incineration of an entire city.
IN FACT, MANY Chinese considered the mushroom cloud over Hiroshima a beautiful and splendid thing. There was no need to be concerned about alienating anyone. The United States could kill anyone and everyone with full world indifference. If an American soldier had been shot in a Japanese village, the U.S. forces could have flattened the entire village without serious complaint. And there lies the paradox: Because the United States had the means and the opportunity to use all the force it had, it did not have to.
History plays tricks on us all. Only a few years ago, Republicans vigorously criticized the Democratic president for "nation-building." Now, a Republican administration finds itself involved in the biggest such program since World War II. It is too early to say whether it will end in success or failure, but we should hope it will be the former - especially if one cares about the long-suffering people of Iraq. However, our task in Iraq, in many ways, is more difficult than our task in Japan was after World War II.
(Editor's note: The writers are, respectively, professors of economics and history at Augusta State University.)
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